2001 ASSLH conference – Goose clubs and wages boards: Marginalising unions at Electrolytic Zinc, Tasmania, 1920-2


Ruth Barton
National Key Centre in Industrial Relations Monash University.


Arbitration has played a central role in Australian industrial relations. Unions have seen gains come from arbitration rather than industrial action and have oriented themselves around arbitration rather then membership need, avoiding industrial militancy. However, some unions have had a tradition of workplace activism and reliance on industrial action, indicating a diversity of experience and relationship with arbitration. McKay’s Harvester Works adopted a strategy of opposing any external interference in the running of the enterprise. Wages Boards and Commonwealth arbitration decisions did not hinder managerial attempts to deskill the workforce and adopt a low wage strategy. Within this context arbitration did not create dependent unionism but rather assisted managerial strategy. This paper aims to explore the interplay between arbitration and the unions at EZ between 1920 and 1922.

In 1917 the Collins House Group formed a new company, Electrolytic Zinc (EZ), to operate a Works in Hobart that would produce zinc ingots through an electrolysis process. As with a number of the Collins House companies,1 EZ implemented a comprehensive programme of industrial welfarism. The company used this and the arbitration system to manage their workforce in a way that had important implications for the trade unions at the Works. There has been considerable debate on arbitration’s role in framing union strategy and tactics. Howard argues that the interplay between arbitration and the unions has seen unions became dependent on the state. Unions have seen gains come from arbitration rather than industrial action. Consequently unions have oriented themselves around arbitration rather then membership need and have shown disdain towards industrial militancy and organisation.2 This approach has been challenged by Gahan on the grounds it lacked historical veracity. He argues that whilst the introduction of arbitration influenced the behaviour and character of individual unions, it was mediated by a range of other factors such as the structure of product and labour markets and management strategies. Such a diversity of experience and relationship with arbitration does not equate with dependent unionism.3 This paper aims to explore the interplay between arbitration, managerial strategy and the unions at EZ between 1920 and 1922. Specifically it assesses the impact of arbitration and managerial strategy on union type and strength.

The establishment of EZ

EZ was established during a time of profound change in the Australian economy. The period between the wars marked Britain’s retreat from the international economy to the Empire, where political servility was translated into concrete privileges for British capital through agreements such as Imperial Trade Preference. A rise in unemployment and the loss of export markets to countries such as America gave rise to a policy that aimed at the efficient reallocation of capital and labour within the Empire. Australia was seen as an ideal country for the allocation of British capital.4 This was assisted by Australia undergoing a spate of relatively autonomous manufacturing development encouraged by the captive market situation of the war. The interaction of the conditions of economic decline in Britain and the emergence of broader manufacturing possibilities in Australia provided the basis for the growth of the metals sector and its subsequent development.

It was against this background that the Collins House group established EZ at Risdon, Tasmania. This was an alliance of Anglo-Australian lead-zinc interests that had largely been based in Broken Hill. Along with the Broken Hill Proprietary Company this group dominated heavy manufacturing development in the inter war period. The establishment of EZ was in a real sense made possible by the First World War. Australia’s rising war-induced need for metals, coupled with shortages of imports, kept demand running ahead of production. A fortuitous zinc deal, mediated by Prime Minister W M Hughes, with the British government made the establishment of EZ a certainty.5

At this stage Tasmania was embarking on a policy of hydro-industrialisation in an attempt to move away from an economy based on small, local industries. Cheap hydro electricity was central to EZ’s decision to locate at Risdon in Tasmania. A miniature electrolytic plant was established in 1917. In 1920 the plant was extended to produce 100 tons of zinc daily.6 At this stage EZ employed over 8007 construction and production workers. The production process involved sending zinc concentrates from Rosebery and Broken Hill to Hobart. The zinc oxide concentrates were roasted to form calcine, which was then leached in sulphuric acid to form a solution of zinc sulphate. The next step involved electrolysis of the solution and the melting of the cathode zinc and casting into ingots8. EZ represented a new form of manufacturing industry. As a major employer EZ had the ability to wield significant influence in the small Tasmanian regional economy. The Wages Boards presented just such an opportunity.

Wages boards in Tasmania

The first Tasmanian Wages Board Act was passed in 1910 by the Nationalist government of Sir Elliot Lewis. This system was introduced following the deliberations of the 1907 Royal Commission on Wages and Wage Earners and was supposedly to give some protection to workers. Manufacturers favoured the Wages Boards on the grounds it enabled them to avoid Federal awards. The initial Act provided for the establishment of boards for individual crafts but was altered in 1920 to change the Boards from a craft to an industrial basis. This allowed all workers in an industry to be covered by a single award.9 It was this legislation that governed EZ. The function of the Boards was to determine wages and conditions in trades and industries that were not subject to Commonwealth industrial legislation or other state legislation. The Boards were required to fix minimum rates of pay and maximum hours, and to specify journeymen classifications and the classes of work to be performed by juniors. They were able to give rulings on a wide range of other industrial matters such as overtime, penalty rates, leave entitlement, and the period of notice required for termination of employment. The Boards were appointed by the minister and consisted of an equal number of nominated representatives from the employer and employee sides of the industry, and an independent chair. Each representative voted on the proposed agreement with the chair able to decide a tied vote.10

The unions criticised the Wages Board Act because, unlike the industrial tribunals in other states, their union officials were not given recognition in front of the Wages Board. It was mandatory for the employee Wages Board representatives to have been engaged in the industry for twelve months during the past five years. Consequentially many full-time union officials could not participate in the Wages Boards. The final unpalatable point was that the Wages Boards often paid lower rates than the Federal Court.11 These factors made Federal awards attractive to the unions. At EZ there were a number of attempts by various unions over a long period of time to break away from the Wages Board system and become parties to federal awards.

Industrial welfarism at EZ

Australia’s integration into the international capitalist economy was marked by the reorganisation of work and labour.12 The large companies at the forefront of this restructuring, such as the Collins House Group, were often involved in experiments on labour discipline. They were influenced by the “New Liberalism” with its concerns about efficiency, labour productivity and cooperation,13 and used welfarism as means of gaining workforce loyalty.14 As with many of the Collins House Group of companies,15 EZ’s labour management strategy involved comprehensive industrial welfarism. EZ built a model industrial village at Lutana near the Works and made many other welfare provisions such as a cooperative store, dentist and doctor.16 Through the interlocking memberships of the Cooperative Council, Works Committee and Wages Boards, EZ management were able to exert significant control over their workforce.

The EZ Works Committee was formed in 1920 to discuss wages.17 Its constitution declared that “the general function of the Committee was to assist the cooperation of the employees with the Company and discuss all matters relating to working conditions, wages, health, safety, efficiency and industrial matters generally, as distinguished from the trading, social and athletic activities controlled by the Cooperative Council. Wages and overtime shall be determined with the machinery provided by law.” The Works Committee had representation from the employees, the company and the Cooperative Council. Employee representatives were elected from each section of the factory with the number of representatives being proportional to the number of men working in the section. The ratio of Company representatives was set at not more than one for every three employee representatives.18

For the first year of its operation the Works Committee dealt with all matters of wages and conditions. In 1921 this role was usurped when the EZ Wages Board was established. In practice the Works Committee continued to exist and made recommendations on wages that were mostly then ratified by the Wages Board.19 The Works Committee was able to act as a de facto Wages Board. The joint welfarist and industrial mechanisms covered all of the workers’ working life and, for many, their social lives as well. The unions at EZ found the Works Committee and Wages Board contentious and were divided in their approach to them.

Wages boards and the EZ unions

The 1920 world slump in metal prices caused Risdon’s small operating plant to become unprofitable and forced it to close. Although the majority of the workers were transferred to construction jobs, 150 were dismissed on 31 December 1920.20 In early 1921 it appeared another 80 workers would be dismissed. Agreement was reached that the employees were to continue at their present rates of pay until 1 September, thereby foregoing an increase of 1/- to 1/3 per day, and that a Zinc Wages Board be formed as soon as possible.21 The Works Committee agreed on a 48 hour week and daily rates of 18/- for tradesman and 14/4 for builders labourers to apply from March to September 1921.22 EZ management anticipated that a single industry Wages Board would bring uniformity and enable wages to be set at a single tribunal sitting.23 EZ management were able to use depressed market conditions and the threat of retrenchments to encourage the workforce to forgo a wage increase and agree to the formation of a Wages Board.

The Hobart Trades Hall Council (HTHC) opposed the introduction of the Wages Boards. At an HTHC meeting in March 1921 Jack O’Neill, of the Carters and Drivers Union, expressed the opinion that “the present Wages Board Legislation had been framed to suit the interests of the employing class and not the employees.” The HTHC recommended that the unions refrain from nominating any delegates to the Wages Board “until such time as the Government sees fit to bring in a more equitable act.” Unable to nominate full time officials to the Boards the HTHC strategy was for the unions to disassociate themselves from the Boards.

The Wages Board coverage of both trades and industry opened the potential for conflict in a large employer such as EZ. The prospect of wages and conditions being determined by a distant trade Wages Board did not fit with EZ management’s desire for a single industry Board. With the Works Committee agreement was still in operation the newly constituted Zinc Wages Board met in May and reached agreement on a determination to commence in June. In May the Building Trades Wages Board also met and awarded workers in that industry a 44 hour week and rates of 20/- per day for tradesmen and 18/- per day for builder’s labourers. This represented a shorter working week and more pay than the Works Committee agreement. The builders at EZ, supported by Chief Inspector of Factories, believed they were covered by the Building Industries Board and could therefore not be covered by the Zinc Works Board and its determination. After mass meetings the builders at EZ commenced work at 8am instead of their usual 7.40 am The Company convened the Works Committee and told the employee representatives that those men who did not start at 7.40 am would not be allowed to start at all. In effect they would be locked out.24

On Saturday 21 May the construction workers arrived for work at 8 am instead of the usual 7.40 am, to find they had been locked out. After a meeting with EZ’s General Manager Herbert Gepp, the Builders Labourers Federation (BLF) officials recommended to their members that they should resume work on Monday at 7.40 am and under the previous conditions, on the proviso that their claim be heard in the Supreme Court.25 A further mass meeting in Trades Hall supported the union officials recommendation on the hours of work and decided that the delegates representing the various trades on the Works Committee should be asked to resign from that Committee.26 This further weakened the potential for the union to influence the Works Committee and therefore the Wages Board.

EZ and the unions then settled into the lengthy and complicated process of determining which Board covered the builders. This process involved the Chief Secretary of the Industrial Department, which administered the Wages Board system, the Premier Sir Walter Lee, union officials, Works Committee members, EZ representatives and the Attorney General’s Department.27 On investigation the Premier found the building trade was a prescribed trade because it trained its own apprentices. The Builders and Painters Wages Board rates would have to be paid regardless of the employing industry. He then declared that it had been decided to rescind the regulation making the building trade a prescribed trade. This meant the Builder’s and Painter’s Wages Board would not cover all builder and painters but would only pick up those not covered by industry specific Wages Boards. As the Zinc Wages Board covered all designations and trades at EZ, the builders and painters would come under its ambit.28 The Tasmanian Labor Party owned daily newspaper, The World, was outspoken in its criticism of Lee. It pointed out that, whilst the Premier’s decision attempted to bring uniformity, it had produced the situation whereby a tradesman engaged in construction could work at EZ and be classified as a zinc worker and enjoy different wages and conditions than if he worked at a different site doing exactly the same work. The paper argued that Lee had flagrantly manipulated the law to EZ’s benefit and that the case had been decided outside the confines of the legal system in “ceremonial and convenient tangos” between EZ and the government. The significance of this dispute is twofold. The Premier’s intervention reveals EZ’s influence as a significant employer in a small regional economy. The outcome was to have all employees under a single industry Wages Board that appears to have awarded inferior pay rates and hours of work. EZ management were able to exert a degree of influence over the Works Committee and EZ Wages Board that would not have been possible in a trade Wages Board with broader, external representation. The BLF’s response was to withdraw its Works Committee representation thereby further diluting union influence over the setting of wages and conditions at EZ.

The AEU’s quest for federal award coverage

With the issue of trades Wages Boards dismissed, the Amalgamated Engineering Union (AEU) attempted to gain Federal award coverage. In May 1921 Justice Higgins had ruled that the engineers at EZ came under the Federal Arbitration Court’s award. Under the Arbitration Court ruling the engineers were awarded a 44 hour week and £6/5/9 in wages. This compared favourably to the EZ Wages Board which paid £5/8/- for a 48 hour week.29 The Company begrudgingly accepted the Federal Court’s decision and informed the AEU secretary30 that the Company would be seeking a variation to exempt EZ from the award.31 At EZ’s request the 170 AEU members continued to work 48 hours, comprising 44 hours and 4 hours overtime.32

The case went before Federal Arbitration in March 1922. The Superintendent of EZ’s Industrial Department, A W Hutchin, argued that the engineers had broken the uniform conditions at the Works and introduced discontent by being able to work fewer hours for more pay. Hutchin contended that AEU wages and hours should not be determined by engineering conditions throughout Australia but by local EZ conditions.33 EZ’s counsel claimed the Company aimed to “provide congenial employment for Australians at good wages and under the best of conditions.” The company pointed out that AEU members, including George Hargreaves, comprised 50% of the employee members on the Works Committee, yet they had agreed to the resolutions that had later been ratified by the Zinc Wages Board.

The AEU representative, George Hargreaves, contended that the AEU members had refused to accept the Wages Board determination on the grounds they were expecting an award from the Arbitration Court. He portrayed the Works Committee as a company creation designed to prevent access to the Courts. He argued that employee representatives feared their employer and were afraid to express their beliefs.34 Under the Works Committee constitution Hargreaves had been elected to represent a section of the Works by the men who worked in that area. On this basis he argued that on the Works Committee he represented the men at the Works and not the ASE.35 The structure set up by EZ management posed a series of strategic dilemmas for the unions. A refusal to participate in the structure left the unions without influence but any association could have the union bound by the decisions.

In his decision Justice Powers referred to the fact that the EZ Wages Board had been appointed to determine conditions and wages for all employees including ASE members. Powers suggested the ASE had accepted the EZ Wages Board by agreeing with the establishment of the Board and by accepting the benefits and wages fixed by the Board. This conclusion, he argued, was made even stronger by Hargreaves’ prominent role in establishing the EZ Wages Board. Hargreaves’ presidency of the Cooperative Council and membership of the Works Committee had weakened the ASE’s case for exclusion from the EZ Wages Board.36 Powers’ decision exempted EZ from Federal Awards. It placed the AEU members under the Wages Board, reduced the basic wage from 84/- to 77/- per week, established the working week at 48 hours and made provision for the quarterly adjustment of wages based on the Commonwealth statistician’s figures.37 Although the AEU did not have formal representation on the Works Committee it was, through George Hargreaves, seen as involved by association. This weakened its case for exclusion from the Wages Board.

The AEU Federal Office refused to accept the decision. In a national ballot, AEU members had voted overwhelmingly in favour of the 44 hour week. In September 1922 the AEU held a meeting with the union president, George Hargreaves, in the chair. The meeting resolved that all shops not working 44 hours would commence to do so the following week. The ASE members believed they had secured the 44 hour week after a long uphill battle and at great financial expense, and were not prepared to sacrifice it without a fight.38 The engineers at EZ were one of the shops working a 48 hour week.

On 30 September ASE members had absented themselves from work on Saturday mornings. EZ responded by handing a notice to all ASE members warning them of the consequences they would face if they chose to work a 44 hour week.39 EZ launched a series of unsuccessful legal proceedings against George Hargreaves and the AEU.40 As an outcome of these actions the Supreme Court upheld that the Wages Board Act of 1920 did not empower the Board to determine hours. EZ was ordered to pay Court costs.41 EZ responded by posting a notice informing all engineering employees to work from 7.40 am to 11.55 am on Saturday 8 December.42 On Tuesday 12 December another notice was posted which read “Day work engineering employees who disobeyed the Company’s order requiring them to work on Saturday morning last are discharged for disobedience…” Overall approximately 120 men were dismissed.43 At a mass meeting of ASE members Hargreaves read a statement from Gepp which pointed out the severe financial loss facing the men through loss of pay, court appeals and appearances.44 The next day, in sympathy with the engineers, the shift engineers and electricians applied for their discharges bringing the total number of workers out of work to 135.45 EZ responded to the AEU’s industrial action with a series of legal actions. When these were unsuccessful it resorted to dismissing the workforce.

EZ was confident it would secure victory and the engineers would make a move to resume work in the first week of January 1923.46 The AEU’s national leadership wavered in their determination to pursue the 44 hour week. The worsening economic climate and the union’s parlous financial situation made them nervous about a protracted strike. In spite of the roll back of Higgins decision they remained convinced arbitration rather than industrial action would yield the best outcomes.47 After meetings between the Company, a joint committee of the AEU and the Trades Hall Disputes Committee, the members voted to go back to work at a 48 hour week.48

The industrial dispute at EZ was a watershed for the AEU. It appears to have contributed to the AEU’s decline in Tasmania. At the beginning of the industrial dispute in August 1921 the AEU had 234 Tasmanian members.49 At the finish in December 1922 this had risen to 342 members.50 Membership continued to rise in the six months following the strike but by December 1927 had fallen to 192.51 The AEU attributed this decline to their members being covered by the Wages Boards rather than the federal award.52The AEU had been unable to gain the 44 hour week. EZ had been able to gain exemption from the Federal award on the basis of the AEU’s inferred participation in EZ’s industrial welfarism. The AEU’s workplace activism was met with hostility from the employer. There were tensions between the AEU’s Federal Office opting for a form of unionism that was dependent on arbitration and workplace activism. The outcome was the AEU’s decline at the local level.

In 1925 George Hargreaves took up a position as a full time AEU organiser for Tasmania and country Victoria.53 Hargreaves, in his role as union organiser, reported that, “Owing to the attitude of this firm towards our shop stewards it has been a hard job to keep members in the position.” The AEU refused to allow its members at the Works to become Wages Board representatives.54 The Federal Office made various attempts to have the EZ engineers included in the federal awards, but these attempts appear to have been made with little local support.55 Those that did proceed were defeated on the grounds of the precedent in 1921-22.56 The company’s efforts at union marginalisation and the AEU’s inability to become a party to the federal award appear to have sapped its vitality. The AEU was a spent force. Its dispute in 1921-22 was the last industrial action to occur at the Works for many years.

Company unionism at EZ

Soon after the ASE’s industrial dispute there was an attempt to establish an EZ Employees Industrial Union. The EZ Employees Industrial Union requested that an organiser be allowed to visit the Works during the dinner hour.57 EZ refused on the grounds the organiser would be able to wander through the plant and interfere with work.58 EZ’s Industrial Consultant, Gerald Mussen, believed unionism was irrelevant at EZ. He wrote:

As all wages and overtime are fixed by the Industry Wages Board, and all grievances are dealt within the departments or through the Works Committee as agreed between the Company and its employees, and all Cooperative matters are governed by the Co-operative Council, it is difficult to see any function the Union could usefully undertake. Its sole function under the conditions prevailing at Risdon would be to collect fees from employees to pay the organiser . . . It is equally clear that the Company could not offer any objection to any employee joining such a union that functions only off the job, any more than the Company could object to employees joining a goose club or a lodge.59

EZ management recognised that arbitration and their industrial welfarism acted as a union substitute. They therefore saw little need to recognise the union when they had catered for all their needs. The Zinc Workers Union was active until at least late 1924.60 After 1926 there are no further records of its activities.61 A company union was a rational response to the form of arbitration. Debarred from Federal awards, federally registered unionism was largely irrelevant. The limitation on trade union officials’ participation on the Wages Boards and the HTHC directive that unions refrain from nominating delegates to the Boards made state unions appear irrelevant. A company based union would be inclusive, free from these strictures and able to form a bloc on the Works Committee and Wages Board. It could theoretically give the workforce an organised voice on the setting of their wages and conditions. It is in this sense that arbitration dictated the form that unionism took at EZ and that was company unionism. But such was EZ’s commitment to industrial welfarism that it refused to recognise the union. This affected the Zinc Workers Union’s effectiveness and longevity.

Once EZ had gained a few exemptions the rest appeared to follow easily. In the years between 1921 and 1932 EZ gained no fewer than 17 exemptions from federal awards from unions such as the Federated Engine Drivers and Fireman’s Association, the Amalgamated Engineering Union, the Amalgamated Society of Carpenters and Joiners, the Builders Labourers Federation, the Australian Timber Workers Federation, the Electrical Trades Union, and the Australian Workers Union.62 The company’s affidavits all contained the same core arguments. They emphasised the importance of EZ as an industry, the role of the Wages Board in producing industrial peace and the large number of exemptions EZ had gained from federal awards. Much was made of Sir John Quick’s decision where he outlined the precedents set in other cases and declared

The company made out a very strong case in its affidavit to the effect that it had secured those consolidated industrial conditions set out in the exhibit presented to the Court under Tasmanian law. They are working harmoniously with their employees, local committees working with the management, no unrest and no disturbance. Everything is going on quietly and smoothly.63

EZ management would argue only a small numbers of men were employed in the offending vocation and that the claimant union had no right to represent these employees. Although EZ had hindered the Zinc Workers Union’s attempts to organise, the company had no qualms about claiming the Zinc Workers Union was the most appropriate union for all EZ employees.64 The AEU case set a precedent. It indirectly caused the formation of a marginalised company union, the Zinc Workers Union. EZ management used this union as a justification for not recognising federal unions and their claims.


The state played a central role in labour management at EZ. Although ostensibly formulated to protect the lowly paid, the Wages Board Act 1920 was weighted against employees. It disadvantaged employees by failing to recognise full- time trade union officials as employee representatives. It favoured EZ by enabling the company to avoid federal awards, as in the case of the AEU, and consequently pay lower wage rates. The state took an overly interventionist approach on EZ’s behalf. The Premier appears to have directly intervened to move the builders at EZ from a trade to an industry Wages Board. An industry Wages Board, as opposed to a federal award or industry Wages Board, offered EZ management the opportunity to exert a singular amount of influence over wages. It allowed wages for the entire Works to be set at a single sitting. It avoided wages being influenced by other companies and paid wages that were lower than federal awards and trade Wages Boards. The Wages Boards, with their emphasis on employee rather than trade union representation, acted to marginalise the trade unions.

EZ management used the Wages Board as an extension of their industrial welfarism. Through a strategic use of the arbitration system EZ was able to form an industry Wages Board. This enabled the company to avoid being a party to federal awards, where wages and conditions were influenced by other companies and unions, or a trade Wages Board where wages and conditions would be influenced by other companies. The Wages Board acted as an extension of the Works Committee. Although its responsibility for wage determination was usurped by the Wages Board, the Works Committee continued to exert significant influence over wages. With employee representatives elected from every section of the Works, the Works Committee acted as a trade union substitute. The AEU’s indirect participation on this Committee enabled EZ to avoid federal award coverage. EZ management used the interplay between industrial welfarism and arbitration to marginalise the unions.

EZ’s industrial welfarism and the Wages Board posed a strategic dilemma for the unions. If the unions disassociated themselves they ran the risk of marginalisation. If they participated and attempted to influence events, they ran the risk of incorporation or marginalisation. Although the HTHC recommended the unions should not participate on the Wages Boards, the issue was less clear cut at the workplace level. The unions’ attempted to informally influence the Works Committee and Wages Board by having their members represent the workforce appear to have been futile. Once in dispute with EZ, the BLF’s response was to withdraw its members from the Works Committee thereby weakening its influence on the Wages Board. The AEU’s participation on these bodies weakened the union’s case for exclusion from the Wages Board’s jurisdiction and inclusion under the federal award. The AEU’s inability to obtain federal award coverage saw the union withdraw its members from the Wages Board, its membership fall and workplace activism decline. EZ’s ability to place its workforce under an industry Wages Board and the unions’ decision to withdraw form these bodies marked their marginalisation. In the face of the trade unions’ marginalisation, the workforce was divided over the type of unionism that should operate at EZ. Within the AEU there were arguments about the merits of workplace activism or arbitration to deliver gains to the members. Some of the workforce attempted to form a company union. This withered on the vine in the face of EZ management’s belief that, with comprehensive industrial welfarism in place, unionism was irrelevant.

Union type at EZ was moulded by the structure of arbitration. The interplay between the forms of arbitration meant the unions were unable to use arbitration as a strategy to achieve outcomes for their members. In this sense they were not dependent on arbitration. However union type was formed by, and therefore dependent upon, arbitration. EZ management used the Wages Boards as an extension of their industrial welfarism. The decisions on wages and conditions were formed in the Works Committee and usually rubber-stamped by the Wages Board. The unions’ attempts to move from under the umbrella of the EZ Wages Boards were thwarted by state government intervention, the union’s inferred participation in EZ’s industrial welfare structures and internal tensions over strategy at between the federal and local levels. The inability of trade based unionism to obtain outcomes for its members saw the workforce move towards company unionism. Although this theoretically offered a collective influence over wages and conditions, management’s union substitution policy saw the union wither. Arbitration moulded unionism, but it was mediated by managerial and union strategy.


1 E. Eklund “’Intelligently Directed Welfare Work’?: Labour Management Strategies in Local Context : Port Pirie, 1915-29” Labour History, No 76, May 1999, pp. 130-131.
2 W. A. Howard “Australian Trade Unions in the Context of Union Theory” Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 19, No 3, September 1977, pp. 255-273.
3 P. Gahan “Did Arbitration Make for Dependent Unionism? Evidence from Historical Case Studies” Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol 18, No. 4, December 1996, pp. 648-698.
4 P. Cochrane, Industrialization and Dependence, University of Queensland Press, St. Lucia, 1980, p. 11.
5 Ibid., p. 79.
6 Electrolytic Zinc Company of Australasia Limited, Electrolytic Zinc Company of Australasia Limited Risdon Works Tasmania Description of Activities, Electrolytic Zinc Company of Australasia Limited, Melbourne, nd.
7 P. Richardson “The Origins and Development of the Collins House Group, 1915-1951.” Australian Economic History Review, Vol. 27, No. 1, 1987,3-29.
8 Electrolytic Zinc Company of Australasia Limited, Electrolytic Zinc Company of Australasia Limited Risdon Works Tasmania Description of Activities, Electrolytic Zinc Company of Australasia Limited, Melbourne, nd.
9 P. C. Molhuysen, “The Tasmanian Wages Board System”, Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 14, 1972.
10 R. Wettenhall, A Guide to Tasmanian Administration., Platypus Publications, Hobart, 1968, p. 202.
11 E. J. R. Heyward, “The Tasmanian Wages Board System”, The Economic Record., Vol. 12, 1936, p 113.
12 R. W. Connell and T. H. Irving, Class Structure in Australian History, Longman Cheshire, Melbourne, 1980, pp. 274-275.
13 T. Rowse, Australian Liberalism and National Character, Kibble Books, Melbourne, 1978.
14 C. Wright, The Management of Labour, Oxford University Press, 1995.
15 E. Eklund, “Managers, Workers, and Industrial Welfarism: Management Strategies at ER&S and the Sulphide Corporation, 1895-1929.” Australian Economic History Review, Vol. 37, No. 2, July 1997, 137-157.
16 For more detailed discussion see R. Barton “Cooperation and Labour Management at EZ and Cadbury between 1918 and 1939 “, MA Thesis, Department of History, University of Tasmania, 1989, pp 48-108.
17 C R Baker, The Human Story of Risdon, Typescript, p 46, EZ Library
18 C R Baker, The Human Story of Risdon, Typescript, pp 47-49, EZ Library
19 C R Baker, The Human Story of Risdon, Typescript, p. 50, EZ Library
20 Tasmanian Mail, 24 March 1921.
21 The World, 18 March 1921.
22 The World, 21 May 1921.
23 Tasmanian Mail, 24 March 1921.
24 The World, 21 May 1921.
25 The World, 23 May 1921.
26 The World, 23 May 1921.
27 The World, 28 May 1921.
28 The Mercury, 2 June 1921.
29 The World, 23 August 1921.
30 The Amalgamated Society of Engineers (ASE) changed its name to the Amalgamated Engineering Union (AEU) in 1920. Both names were used interchangeably for a considerable period of time.
31 EZ Records, A/11-3, Hutchin to Secretary ASE, 5 August 1921. Archives Office of Tasmania (hereafter AOT)
32 The World, 23 August 1921.
33 EZ Records, A/11-3, Affidavit of A. W. Hutchin in ASE Case No 113 of 1920. AOT
34 EZ Records, A/11-3, Affidavit of G. Hargreaves in ASE Case No. 113, 10 March 1922. AOT
35 EZ Records, A/11-3, Evidence Given by George Hargreaves in Response to Affidavit, 23 March 1922. AOT
36 EZ Records, A/11-3, Extracts from Mr. Justice Powers Decision, 6 June 1922. AOT
37 EZ Records, A/11-3, Maughan to EZ Melbourne, 9 June 1922. AOT
38 The Mercury, 23 September 1922.
39 The Mercury, 30 September 1922.
40 The Mercury, 26 October 1922.
41 The Mercury, 5 December 1922.
42 The Mercury, 9 December 1922.
43 The Mercury, 12 December 1922.
44 The Mercury, 11 October 1922.
45 The World, 13 December 1922.
6 EZ Records, A/11-3, Hutchin to Colleyshaw, Cadburys, 21 December 1922. AOT
47 T. Sheriden, Mindful Militants: The Amalgamated Engineering Union in Australia, 1920—1972, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1975.
48 The World, 29 December 1922.
49 AEU Reporter, No. 56, August 1921. NBA.
50 AEU Reporter, No. 12, December 1922. NBA
51 AEU Reporter, December 1927. NBA
52 AEU Reporter, No. 1, January 1924. NBA
53 AEU Reporter, No. 8, August 1925. NBA.
54 EZ Records, A/75-1, Affidavit of O. W. Hawkins Against AEU. 1931. AOT
55 EZ Records, A/47-2, Meredith to EZ Melbourne, 26 July 1927. AOT
56 AEU. Reporter, No. 12, December 1925. AOT
57 EZ Records, A/18-2, Culley to Gepp, 14 July 1923. AOT
58 EZ Records, A/18-2, Mussen to Secretary EZ Melbourne, 19 July 1923. AOT
59  EZ. Records, A/18-2, Mussen to Secretary EZ. Melbourne, 19 July 1923. A.O.T.
60 The Mercury, 26 September 1924.
61 EZ Records, A/40-2, File Industrial Builders Labourers, 1926. AOT
62 EZ Records, A/67-1, Note Re Working Hours-Engineers. AOT
63 EZ Records, A/40-2, Affidavit of A. W. Hutchin versus the Australian Builders Labourers Federation, 1926. AOT
64 EZ Records, A/40-2, Affidavit of A. W. Hutchin versus the Australian Builders Labourers Federation, 1926. AOT