Greg Patmore
University of Sydney

Abstract

Australian trade union membership grew dramatically in the period from 1900 to 1914. While there is recognition that compulsory arbitration may have played an important role, there are a range of explanatory factors that may explain the growth. Studies of union growth also neglect the workplace. Through an analysis of the Lithgow Ironworks this paper hopes to broaden the debate about union growth. It attempts to explain why iron and steel unionism arose, briefly collapsed and re-organised at the Ironworks and focuses on the state, management and community or locality. Australian trade union membership grew dramatically in the period from 1900 to 1914. While there is recognition that the introduction of compulsory arbitration may have played an important role, qualitative and quantitative studies have highlighted a range of explanatory factors that may explain the growth. Scholars have been primarily concerned with the industry and national level in examining this period of union growth.¹

 

Through an analysis of the Lithgow Ironworks this paper hopes to broaden the debate about union growth in this particular period and generally. Federal and state governments saw iron and steel as crucial to national development and provided assistance through tariffs and bonuses. The Lithgow plant had operated since 1876, but underwent major capital investment during this period. The Lithgow workers unionised in September 1902. With the exception of a brief period, iron and steel unionism continued at the Lithgow plant for the period under examination.²

This paper attempts to explain the why iron and steel unionism arose, briefly collapsed and re-organised at the Lithgow Ironworks. It initially evaluates the literature concerning trade union membership data and trade union growth theory. Problems with data on union membership lead to a qualitative rather than quantitative approach. While the union growth literature suggests a range of variables that may explain the experience at Lithgow, this paper focuses on three suggested by the surviving archival sources. These are the state, management and community or locality. The paper then provides a historical overview of the plant and focuses on the impact of the three highlighted factors on iron and steel unionism.

Data and concepts

There are particular problems with trade union density data when undertaking research at the enterprise level. Trade union statistics focus on the national, state or industry levels. Official statistics are not kept for individual workplaces, towns or regions. While contemporary researchers may be able to undertake surveys at these levels, this option is not available to the historian. Union archives may provide data for particular branches of the union, but it is unlikely that workplace membership data would have been collected or retained. It is more likely that workplace membership data will survive if the union branch corresponded to the workplace or a particular union only had members in one workplace.³

While the absence of detailed data on union membership can prevent quantitative analysis, there are still sufficient documentary sources available to undertake a qualitative study of a workplace. These sources include local newspapers, company records and government documents. They indicate the general trends in union membership and highlight factors that may be significant in explaining the varying fortunes of organised labour in a particular plant.

While there are a variety of factors that are cited to explanation variations in trade union membership, surviving archival sources suggest three factors that may help partially explain the levels of unionism in the Lithgow Ironworks. These are the state, management and community or locality. There has been a long-standing recognition that a sympathetic state may provide a favourable climate for union formation and growth. Industrial relations scholars have attached importance to particular labor legislation as playing a crucial role in promoting union growth. Historians claim that compulsory arbitration and wages boards made a major contribution to the growth of Australian trade unions between 1900 and 1914. Econometric models of Australian trade union growth incorporate a dummy variable (which has a value of one in a specified period and zero at other times) for compulsory arbitration to account partially for union growth between 1907 and 1913. Compulsory arbitration required workers to form unions to bring grievances before industrial tribunals. The registered unions gained corporate status and monopoly over organisation in certain industries. There were provisions for a common rule and preference to unionists.⁴

There have been criticisms of this emphasis on compulsory arbitration as an explanation for Australian trade union growth between 1900 and 1914. Union membership would have probably grown anyway with the recovery from the 1890s Depression and the boom after 1905. The various econometric studies provide an ad hoc estimate of the impact of arbitration and do not explain the relationship between union growth and arbitration. There is also evidence that some unions collapsed under the strain of the costs associated with arbitration, while registration did not protect unionists from employer victimisation.⁵ Cooper has correctly criticised the arbitration thesis for ignoring “the agency of trade unionist activists in building working class organisation” and seeing “unions instead as mere products of their environment”.⁶ Indeed Peter Sheldon argues that union activism in a favourable economic climate rather than arbitration underlay recruitment for four maritime-related unions in NSW for the period 1900 to 1912.⁷

The attitudes and behaviour of employers towards unions are crucial factor in assisting or hindering trade union growth. Employer attitudes to unions can be influenced by ideology, the economic climate and the legal environment. Employers can weaken trade unionism through either peaceful competition or forcible opposition. The tactics of peaceful competition include offering better wages than the union standard during a union recruitment campaign, establishing elaborate grievance procedures that exclude unions and encouraging company unions. Forcible opposition includes the victimisation of union activists and discrimination against union members in promotion and pay rises. Employers may also engage in repression to contain the possibility of collective action through the use of measures such as blacklists.⁸

The community or local context of the workplace can have an impact on unionism. The workers’ geographic location, the operation of local labour markets and local industrial/political traditions can lead to variations in industrial behaviour in specific locations even where there is the same employer, labour processes, industrial agreement and trade union. Differences in the industrial employment structure between localities are not sufficient to explain spatial differences in strike rates. In areas where there has been a long history of union organisation a tradition of “union culture” may develop that assists labour organising and encourages a greater acceptance of unions by local employers. While it should not be assumed that union culture remains unchanged over time or is locally homogeneous⁹, locally based traditions once established “can exhibit a high degree of socio-institutional persistence over time, and, at the very least, influence the nature of subsequent changes and developments”.¹⁰ The spatial organisation of classes in a particular location can also have an impact. Where workers and their employers live in close proximity there may be a greater probability of class alliances or “labour-community coalitions” in dealing with external threats or opportunities.¹¹

This paper will now examine the impact of the state, employers and the community context upon unionism in the iron and steel plants in Lithgow. The state and the community context had a positive impact on Lithgow plant unionism. Lithgow management was not hostile to trade unionism before 1907 and the climate changed with the purchase of the plant by the Hoskins family.

An overview of the iron and steel plant at Lithgow, 1900-1914

The iron and steel industry was operating in the Lithgow valley before 1900 but had a volatile history. Coal and the demand of the NSW Government Railways for iron rails prompted a group of non-resident entrepreneurs to establish a blast furnace at Lithgow in 1876. However, cheaper imports, railway freight charges and poor quality iron ore contributed to financial difficulties and the owners demolished the blast furnace in 1884. The owners initially leased the ironworks to a worker cooperative, which rerolled rails, and in 1887 transferred the lease to William Sandford. He had experience managing ironworks in the United Kingdom and had come to Australia in 1883 to manage a wire-netting plant for John Lysaght in Melbourne. In 1892 Sandford bought the Ironworks and the Lithgow plant employed approximately 200 workers by 1898.¹²

From 1900 to 1914 the Lithgow underwent major capital investment. Sandford expanded the ironworks by installing a steel furnace in 1900 and re-establishing a blast furnace in 1907 on the basis of a guaranteed NSW Government contract for steel rails. The capital investment in the new blast furnace overextended Sandford’s finances and his bank foreclosed on him in December 1907. G&C Hoskins Ltd., which manufactured iron pipes in Sydney and was a major customer of the Lithgow Ironworks, purchased the plant. The Hoskins family benefited from the NSW Government contract for rails. They also gained from the federal government bounties introduced for steel production in 1909. The Lithgow plant, with the assistance of the bonuses, shifted from losses in 1909 to profits by 1914. The improving financial position led Hoskins to complete a second blast furnace in 1913. The expansion of the iron and steel works led to a dramatic growth in employment and contributed to Lithgow’s overall population growth. By 1911 the total number of employees at the plant was 1052. The town’s population increased from 5268 in 1901 to 8196 in 1911.¹³

There were two phases of trade unionism at Lithgow. From 1902 to 1910 the most significant union was the Eskbank Ironworkers’ Association, which changed its name in March 1909 to the Eskbank Iron and Steel Workers’ Association. This union only covered the Lithgow plant and membership figures in Table 1 are derived from its returns to the NSW Registrar of Trade Unions and Friendly Societies for the period from 1903 to 1909.

Table 1—Eskbank Ironworkers’ Association Membership, 1903-09

Year	Union Membership	Employment	Union Density (%)
1903	102	340	30
1904	107	309	35
1905	107	351	30
1906	142	490	29
1907	241	835	29
1908	357	632	56
1909	282	950	30

Mill and forge workers at the Lithgow Ironworks reformed the Eskbank Ironworkers’ Association on 13 September 1902. This union was built on a strong tradition of unionism at the Lithgow site. The first Eskbank Ironworkers’ Association had been formed in 1882 and revived on several subsequent occasions. The desire to gain the broader support of the labour movement for a federal bonus bill and to obtain access to the fledgling arbitration system were major motivations for the re-formation of the union in 1902. The union gained the support of the Lithgow Council in February 1904 for a joint approach to the Prime Minister to have a bonus on iron production. It obtained management recognition. The union fought wage reductions at the Lithgow plant in 1903 and were able to negotiate an agreement with Sandford. While the agreement upheld Sandford’s wage reductions, it provided for a joint union/management conciliation board to handle grievances, a sliding scale linking wages to product prices and preference to unionists. In June 1904 the union obtained the intervention of the NSW Arbitration Court, when it ratified the agreement as an award and provided penalties for award breaches. While there does appear to be an increase in union density in 1904, the award and preference to unionists did not provide the basis for any permanent increase in union density before 1908.¹⁴

The Eskbank Ironworkers’ Association experienced unprecedented growth in 1908 before its eventual collapse by the end of 1910. The growth was set against the background of the efforts by Hoskins to make the plant solvent. Worker discontent increased as Hoskins restructured work to reduce labour costs and challenged established customs such as smoking at work. Between March 1908 and April 1909 there were four disputes over wages and work organisation. The union to increase industrial strength began actively recruiting workers at the blast furnace in January 1908. These workers held a strategic position in the production process as the blast furnace required continued operation to avoid considerable expenditure by management on repairs. The blast furnace workers had previously attempted to form their own union in October 1907. The Eskbank Ironworkers’ Association refused to accept wage cuts and Hoskins initiated a lockout in July 1908, for which he and his company were fined by the NSW Arbitration Court. The union successfully applied for a wages board under the NSW Industrial Disputes Act, which consisted of a judge as chair and an equal number of employee and employer representatives from the Lithgow Ironworks. It obtained an award in March 1909, which was disappointing. The award upheld some of Hoskins’s wages cuts and his preference for time based rates rather than tonnage rates. The award did retain a preference to unionists clause, but this did not prevent a serious decline in union membership in 1909. The union was moribund by the end of 1910 despite an attempt by the Sydney NSW Iron Trades Council to revive it in September 1910.¹⁵

The second phase of unionism at the Lithgow plant had commenced by at least August 1910 when workers at the blast furnace again formed their own Blast Furnace Workers’ Association. This union, which only had 92 members, decided in January 1911 to expand the coverage of the union by affiliating to the nationally organised Federated Ironworkers’ Association (FIA), thereby gaining access to federal arbitration rather than registering under the unpopular NSW Industrial Disputes Act. The union began actively recruiting other Lithgow ironworkers. This organising ensured the success of the union in the longest dispute in the history of the Lithgow Valley, which occurred at the Lithgow Ironworks from July 1911 to April 1912. It arose from the victimisation of a union delegate at the Lithgow Ironworks Tunnel Colliery. The strike settlement forced Hoskins to reinstate the dismissed delegate. Unfortunately there is no data series available for union membership at the Lithgow Ironworks after 1909.¹⁶

Overall the Lithgow iron and steel workers were unionised from 1902 to 1914 with the exception of brief period. The next three sections will look at factors that may help explain the Lithgow experience. These are the state, management and the community context.

The role of the state

While during this period both the federal and NSW governments in Australia introduced compulsory arbitration legislation to regulate industrial relations, it brought mixed blessings for the Lithgow Ironworks workers. The Australian legislation in principle assisted unionisation by assuming that workers would prefer union representation.

The arbitration acts clearly influenced both the formation and shape of unionism. Access to the NSW Industrial Arbitration Court was one of the major motivations underlying the formation of the Eskbank Ironworkers’ Association in October 1902. The Blast Furnace Workers’ Association’s decision in January 1911 to affiliate with the FIA was prompted by a desire to gain access to federal arbitration rather than registering under the unpopular NSW Industrial Disputes Act. There, however, is no evidence that the Lithgow plant unions used the preference to unionists clause to promote union membership. The 1904 and 1909 awards were also associated with decline in union membership. These awards may have contributed to worker disillusionment with arbitration as a union strategy. Both awards upheld wages cuts by employers and the 1909 award supported Hoskins’s preference for time-based rates. Registration within the industrial arbitration system and preference to unionists in the 1909 award did not prevent the collapse of the Eskbank Ironworkers’ Association in 1910.¹⁷

The Lithgow workers benefited from a sympathetic political climate after 1910. There were federal and NSW Labor Party governments. The Labor Party gained control of Lithgow Council for the first time on 28 January 1911, winning eight out of twelve seats. An important part of Labor Party policy was the nationalisation of monopolies such as the Lithgow Ironworks. During the 1911-12 Lithgow Ironworks strike the Lithgow Council was generally sympathetic to the strikers, authorising a public meeting in Lithgow Park and inspecting strikebreakers’ barracks for breaches of health and housing regulations. The federal and state Labor governments intervened in the strike to Hoskins’s detriment.¹⁸

From the outset Labor parliamentarians criticised Hoskins. The NSW Minister for Labor and Industry stated that “Hoskins must accept responsibility for this trouble”.¹⁹ Hoskins further angered the Labor Party by sending a telegram of support to the NSW Leader of the Opposition during a political crisis, when the Labor Party lost its narrow majority in the Legislative Assembly in late July. The NSW Labor Government tried unsuccessfully to resolve the dispute through the establishment of a special wages board and the direct intervention of Premier McGowen and Labor Ministers. Hoskins refused to meet the strikers’ demand that all strikebreakers be removed.²⁰

The federal and state Labor governments moved against Hoskins. On 30 September 1911 the NSW Attorney-General released John Dixon, the secretary of the Lithgow Branch of the FIA, after eleven days in Darlinghurst goal. He had been sentenced to two months hard labour by the Industrial Court for breaching the anti-strike provisions of the 1908 Industrial Disputes Act. The NSW Labor Government also set up a Royal Commission to investigate whether Hoskins’s government contracts were in the public interest and explore the future prospects of the NSW iron and steel industry. Hoskins criticised the closed hearings of the Commission and walked out of the inquiry in protest at its procedures. The Royal Commission found that Hoskins had breached the government contracts by substituting German steel for steel made from Australian iron ore and the NSW Government cancelled its contracts on 29 November 1911. The Federal Labor Government also embarrassed Hoskins by investigating his pig iron bonus claims and temporarily suspended the bonus after concluding that he unlawfully had obtained approximately 10,252 pounds in bonus. Charles Hoskins came to believe that the federal and state governments were trying to destroy his firm.²¹

Management

Management was sympathetic to trade unions at the Lithgow plant before 1908. William Sandford and William Thornley, who joined the firm from the NSW Government Railways in April 1902 and became general manager in December 1902, were willing to recognise the Eskbank Ironworkers’ Association. There is no evidence that Sandford and Thornley victimised union activists. Sandford’s tolerance of the union continued despite his concern over the financial viability of the plant, particularly with the construction of a new blast furnace, and his belief that his workers’ wages were too high to survive import competition. Sandford was aware of the growing power of the Labor Party, which he hoped would nationalise the plant and introduce protection to ease his financial worries. Thornley was a long- standing member of the Amalgamated Society of Engineers and had informed Sandford upon his appointment that he was a “trade unionist”.²²

Hoskins, who purchased the bankrupt Lithgow plant in December 1907, disliked unions and compulsory arbitration. He was an “advocate of the open shop, non-union labour and day-wages”²³. Hoskins was hostile to the Labor Party and its policy of nationalising monopolies such as the Lithgow Ironworks. The resignation of Thornley as general manager in April 1908 further reduced the sympathy of the Lithgow plant management for unionism. As noted previously Charles Hoskins’s efforts to make the Lithgow plant solvent increased worker discontent and contributed to the growth of the Eskbank Ironworkers’ Association in 1908. His lockout in July 1908 failed to defeat the union and led to a fine from the NSW Industrial Court. Hoskins intensified his victimisation of union activists and contributed to the collapse of the Eskbank Ironworkers’ Association. Hoskins also attempted to weaken the fledgling Lithgow branch of the FIA by refusing to re-employ the branch secretary and denying him entry to the plant after a strike at the blast furnace in February 1911. Several other strikers were denied re-employment. Hoskins’s dismissal of a union delegate from the Lithgow Ironworks Tunnel Colliery for attending Western Miners’ Union meeting led to the 1911-12 Lithgow Ironworks strike. During this strike Hoskins did not discourage strikebreakers from forming their own union, which briefly obtained registration under the NSW Trade Union Act. There are no recorded incidents of victimisation after the strike. The Lithgow branch of the FIA survived the strike and Hoskins had to continue to deal with a state Labor Government before the First World War. Indeed, despite his opposition to nationalisation, he approached the NSW Labor Government following its re-election in December 1913 and proposed the sale of the Lithgow Ironworks to the  state. He depended on federal subsidies for his profits and his domestic monopoly was being challenged through the construction of the Newcastle steelworks by BHP.²⁴

Community context

The Lithgow iron and steel workers enjoyed a supportive community environment. Resistance by landowners at the Western end of the Lithgow Valley to the “unwarranted expansion” of Lithgow reduced the availability of land for housing in the town. The local elite could not obtain large plots of land and had to live in close proximity to the workers. There was no pre-industrial elite as the town developed from industrialisation. The town’s business and social elite were concerned with narrow economic base of Lithgow and the fragility of local industries. They supported the idea that Lithgow would become the “Birmingham of Australia”. Lithgow had the potential to become a major manufacturing centre with a significantly larger population. Economic growth would benefit the town’s businesses, increase revenue for the Lithgow Council and improve job security. There was a long tradition of unionism in the Lithgow Valley. Coalminers formed their first lodge in 1875. As noted previously the first Eskbank Ironworkers’ Association had been formed in 1882. This tradition encouraged the local elite to work with trade union leaders in coalitions to promote the town and be sympathetic to workers’ grievances. The union tradition in Lithgow assisted organisation.²⁵

The business elite and labour leaders particularly focussed on the iron and steel industry to promote economic prosperity. In February 1904 Lithgow Council agreed to co-operate with the Eskbank Ironworkers’ Association in an approach to the Prime Minister to have a bonus on iron production. When the Commercial Banking Company foreclosed on Sandford’s mortgage and retrenched most of his workers in December 1907, the Lithgow Council, the Eskbank Ironworkers’ Association and Lithgow Progress Association participated in a public meeting and organised a deputation to the NSW Premier. In 1908 the Lithgow Mercury editor, representing a town committee formed by the local elite to promote the Lithgow Ironworks, and an Eskbank Ironworkers’ Association official produced a four page pamphlet calling for the passage of a Bonus Bill by federal parliament. This tradition of co-operation clashed with Hoskins’s anti-unionism.²⁶

The retailers and professionals were sympathetic to workers during the 1911-12 Ironworks Strike. Prior to the strike there was local press criticism of Charles Hoskins for his hard-line approach to industrial relations and his treatment of workers. Lithgow labour and business leaders considered Hoskins to be an “outsider”, who failed to understand local custom and practice. During the strike local cinemas held benefit nights. Relief coupons issued by the union defence committee were accepted by 30 retailers and professionals. Towards the end of the strike the Lithgow Mercury and prominent citizens had joined the call for the nationalisation of the Lithgow Ironworks.²⁷

Conclusion

This paper focuses on the fortunes of trade unionism at the Lithgow Ironworks from 1900 to 1914. In the absence of systematic and reliable data the study uses qualitative methods to explain the varying experience of unionism at the plant. While there may be a variety of variables that explain trade union growth, surviving archival sources allow a focus on three issues: state, management and community or locality.

Overall the state had a positive impact on trade unionism at the Lithgow plant. The Labor Party governments provided a sympathetic political climate for the Lithgow branch of the FIA, particularly during the crucial 1911-12 Lithgow Ironworks Strike. Labor Government ministers publicly criticised Hoskins and directly intervened to release the FIA Lithgow Branch secretary from jail. Hoskins was financially weakened by the cancellation of the NSW Government contract.

The Lithgow experience reinforces the view that the benefits of compulsory arbitration have been exaggerated. Features of compulsory arbitration such as preference to unionists appear to have had little impact on trade union membership. Compulsory arbitration did not guarantee the survival of the Eskbank Ironworkers’ Association. However, compulsory arbitration was a major impetus for the formation of unions and decisions concerning coverage.

The experience of the Lithgow plant emphasises the need to look at the impact of management attitudes towards unions on union growth. The Eskbank Ironworkers’ Association was established in a climate of sympathetic management. While there may be questionable motives, such as Sandford’s desire to have the Labor Party ease his financial burdens through nationalisation or protection, Sandford and Thornley persisted with their positive view of unionism at the Lithgow plant despite their financial concerns. Hoskins was less sympathetic and assist the destruction of the union through victimisation. Nevertheless there were limitations on management at Lithgow. During the 1911-1912 Lithgow Hoskins’s attempt to destroy the FIA was thwarted by unsympathetic Labor Governments. Indeed in the wake of the strike Hoskins became less belligerent towards the FIA as he tried to persuade the NSW Labor Government to nationalise his plant.

Finally this paper highlights the spatial dimension of trade unionism. The Lithgow plant operated in a community which had a long tradition of labour organisation. This helped union organising and encouraged even the local elite to see unionism as part of custom and practice. The sympathy of the local elite for workers in Lithgow can also be explained by the land shortages in Lithgow that led them to live in close proximity. While this community support played an important role for the Lithgow workers in public and collective confrontations such as the 1911-12 strike, it was less effective against more individualised and subtle anti-union tactics such as victimisation.

Endnotes

¹ G. S. Bain and F. Elsheikh, Union Growth and the Business Cycle, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1976, pp. 94-100; R. Cooper, “Making the NSW Union Movement? A Study of the Organising and Recruitment Activities of the NSW Labor Council 1900-10”, Industrial Relations Research Centre, University of New South Wales, Sydney, 1996; R. Markey, “Trade unions, the Labor Party and the introduction of arbitration in New South Wales and the Commonwealth” in S. Macintyre and R. Mitchell (eds.), Foundations of Arbitration. The Origins and Effects of State Compulsory Arbitration, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1989, 171-72; G. Patmore, Australian Labour History, Longman Cheshire, 1991, 120-1, 122-6; P. Sheldon, “Missing nexus? Union recovery, growth and behaviour during the first decades of arbitration: towards a revaluation”, Australian Historical Studies, 26, 104, 1995, 415-437.
² Form A, Trade Union Act 1881, 23.9.02. State Archives Office of NSW (hereafter SAONSW), Kingswood 10421/31, file 247; G. Patmore, “Localism and Industrial Conflict: The 1911-12 Lithgow Ironworks Strike Revisited”, Labour and Industry, 10, 1, 1999, 62-64.
³ Bain and Price, Profiles of Union Growth, 3; R. Martin, P. Sunley and J. Wills, Union Retreat and the Regions. The Shrinking Landscape of Organized Labour, Jessica Kingsley Publishers, London, 1996, 19-20.
⁴ Bain and Elsheikh, Union Growth, 40-42; Patmore, Australian Labour History, 120-1.
⁵ Cooper, Making the NSW Union Movement, 57-59; P. Sheldon, “Arbitration and Union Growth: Building and Construction Unions in NSW, 1901-1912”, The Journal of Industrial Relations, 35, 3, 1993, 385.
⁶ Cooper, Making the NSW Union Movement, 62.
⁷ P. Sheldon, “Compulsory Arbitration and Union Recovery: Maritime-Related Unions 1900-1912”, The Journal of Industrial Relations, 40, 3, 1998, 422-440.
⁸ G. S. Bain, The Growth of White-Collar Unionism, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1970. 131-5; J. Kelly, Rethinking Industrial Relations. Mobilization, Collectivism and Long Waves, Routledge, London, 1998, 56-8
⁹ A. Herod, “The Spatiality of Labor Unionism. A Review Essay” in A. Herod (ed.), Organizing the Landscape. Geographical Perspe ctives on Labor Unionism, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1998, 24-8; R. Martin, P. Sunley and J. Wills, “The geography of trade union decline: spatial dispersal or regional resilience?”, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, NS, 18, 1993, 55; Martin, Sunley and Wills, Union Retreat and the Regions, 141-51; J. Wills, “Geographies of Trade Unionism: Translating Traditions Across Space and Time”, Antipode, 28, 4, 1996, 352-378.
¹⁰ Martin, Sunley and Wills, Union Retreat and the Regions, 16.
¹¹ G. Patmore, “Labour-Community Coalitions and State Enterprise: Retrenchment at the Lithgow Small Arms Factory 1918-1932”, The Journal of Industrial Relations, 39, 2, 1997, 218-243.
¹² Lithgow Mercury, 22.9.1899, 4; Patmore, “Localism and Industrial Conflict”, 62.
¹³ I. Jack and A. Cremin, Australia’s Age of Iron. History and Archaeology, Oxford University Press, South Melbourne, 1994, 114-115; Patmore, “Localism and Industrial Conflict”, 62-3.
¹⁴ “Eskbank Ironworkers v. Sandford”, NSW Industrial Arbitration Reports, 3, 1904, 319-22; Eskbank Ironworkers’ Association, Rules of the Eskbank Ironworkers’ Association, Mercury Newspaper Co., Lithgow, 1902, 2; Lithgow Mercury, 16.9.1902, 2, 19.12.1902, 4, 6.1.1903, 2, 29.5.1903, 4; 2.6.1903, 2; G. Patmore, “ Localism and Labour: Lithgow 1869-1932”, Labour History, no. 78, 2000, p. 62.
¹⁵ E. M. Johnston-Liik, G. Liik, R. G. Ward, A Measure of Greatness. The Origins of the Australian Iron and Steel Industry, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1998, 120-8; Lithgow Mercury, 17.1.1908, 4, 20.1.08, 2, 13.4.08, 2, 15.3.09, 2; Patmore, “Localism and Industrial Conflict”, 63.
¹⁶Lithgow Mercury, 30.1.1911, 2; Patmore, “Localism and Industrial Conflict”, 64-74.
¹⁷Lithgow Mercury, 16.9.1902, 2, 30.1.1911, 2.
¹⁸ Patmore, “Localism and Industrial Conflict”, 64-6, 70.
¹⁹Lithgow Mercury, 26.7.1911, 2
²⁰ Patmore, “Localism and Industrial Conflict”, 69.
²¹ Ibid., 68-9.
²² Lithgow Mercury, 8.4.1902, 2, 2.12.1902, 2, 6.1.1903, 2, 7.4.1903, 2, 22.7.1907, 2; William Sandford, “Correspondence and Notebooks”, Mitchell Library (hereafter ML) MSS 1556/1 Items 4-6, ML MSS 1638/21.
²³ N. R. Wills, Economic Development of the Australian Iron and Steel Industry, University of Sydney, Sydney, 1948, 62.
²⁴ Johnston-Liik, Liik and Ward, A Measure of Greatness, 123; Lithgow Mercury, 13.10.1905, 4, 10.4.1908, 4, 15.7.1908, 2, 7.4.1909, 2, 8.3.1911, 2, 28.8.1911, 2, 1.9.1911, 4; Patmore, “Localism and Industrial Conflict”, 63, 66-8, 72.
²⁵ Patmore, “ Localism and Labour”, 56, 62, 66.
²⁶ Ibid., 66.
²⁷ Patmore, “Localism and Industrial Conflict”, 67, 70.